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A Substantial Interest: Why the Government is 
Legally Justified in Prohibiting Disparaging 
Trademarks 
By Jessica Mikkelson† and Michael Van Muelken†† 
Introduction 
Imagine sitting down on a Sunday afternoon with friends and family to 
watch your local football team play in “the big game.”  Now picture the team 
being cheered on by several thousand fans.  It seems like an idyllic Sunday 
afternoon.  The only problem is that this team is named after a popular slur 
used to identify your racial or ethnic group.  This slur is broadcast over 
television, the Internet, and in homes all across the country.  This 
hypothetical is a reality for Native Americans today. 
It would seem logical to change the name because it is disparaging and 
part of a horrible era in American history.  Surprisingly, it took a large public 
outcry before a district court concluded that the Washington Redskins’ 
trademark was disparaging, and not registrable as a trademark under the 
Lanham Act.1  On the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, recently upheld the registration of the mark, 
“The Slants,” for an Asian-American rock band. 
The history of the First Amendment is too extensive to explain fully in 
this Article.  However, the trend in U.S. Supreme Court cases has been to 
find content-based restrictions unconstitutional unless the legitimate 
government interest withstands strict scrutiny.2  At first glance, the Lanham 
Act’s prohibition on disparaging trademarks appears to be inconsistent.  
However, the prohibition on disparaging trademarks is different because the 
government is not telling people or entities that they cannot use a name, 
writing, or mark; all that is rejected is the government’s public validation.  
This is well within the government’s power. 
 
 †. J.D., Hamline University School of Law. She currently works as a housing 
attorney at HomeLine. 
 ††. J.D., University of Minnesota Law School. 
 1. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012). 
 2. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (holding that a 
city ordinance banning hate speech is unconstitutional based on the opinion of the 
message expressed); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“[T]he government 
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea 
itself offensive or disagreeable.”). 
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Even though a trademark is not an absolute right, the government is 
not permitted to deny the application based upon a constitutionally protected 
right, in this instance free speech rights.3 Additionally, the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that issuing a trademark is not subjected to 
Congress’s spending powers because the benefit is non-monetary.4  The 
Lanham Act is derived from the Commerce Clause and it is designed to 
regulate interstate commerce.5  Therefore, restrictions on disparaging marks 
do not bear directly on the objectives of protecting the owner’s investment.6 
In considering whether or not a trademark is actually commercial 
speech, the Tam court found that the restrictions of the Lanham Act failed to 
withstand the intermediate scrutiny challenge7:  the government restrictions 
on the band’s name were not narrowly tailored to meet a specific objective in 
which the government has a substantial interest.8  All the arguments 
proffered by the government in Tam were based on the government’s desire 
to ban speech it finds offensive.  This reasoning has never been a substantial 
interest in justifying any disparaging marks.9 
This decision opens the door for a wide variety of offensive trademarks 
to be registered, and the Tam court recognized as much in its conclusion.10  
Prior to this case, courts took the stance that the trademark registration was 
not an attempt to legislate morality.11  Rather, a trademark used government 
funding, a form of speech, to hold out to the world that the trademark was 
neither scandalous nor offensive.12  The Tam decision has the most bearing 
on the Washington Redskins litigation.  This Article argues that, in light of 
the Tam decision, it is unlikely the Washington Redskins will lose their 
trademark. 
I. Congress Has Historically Prohibited Scandalous or Immoral 
Trademarks 
Congress prohibited scandalous or immoral content first in the 1905 
Trademark Act.  Decades passed before the administrative decisions 
interpreted what is scandalous by considering if it was “shocking to the sense 
of propriety or call out condemnation.”13  Courts developed a two-part test to 
 
 3. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 4. Id. at 1354. 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8; In re Tam, 808 F.2d at 1354. 
 6. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1354. 
 7. Id. at 1355. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 1357. 
 10. Id. at 1357–58. 
 11. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1981). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Jasmine Abdel-khalik, Disparaging Trademarks: Who Matters, 20 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 287, 294–95 (2015). 
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determine what is scandalous:  (1) determine the likely meaning of the mark 
within the context of the associated goods or services in the application, any 
other elements in the mark, and the marketplace; and (2) evaluate whether a 
substantial composite of the general public would find the mark scandalous 
in light of the contemporary application.14 
Throughout the years, the following categories have been prohibited 
from trademarks:  political images, vulgar language, religious terms and 
icons, sexual content, and identity issues involving race, gender, or sexual 
orientation.15  Once an application is processed, there may still be public 
opposition.  A statement of use and intent is required to be filed as part of the 
registration process.16  Registration is not a guaranteed use because any 
trademark may be challenged based on the test for scandalous content.17 
In the 1930’s, Representative Lanham began the process of rewriting 
the scandalous requirement.  Various speakers opposed removing the 
scandalous requirement and leaving the limitation on disparaging because 
these individuals thought it would become too narrowly interpreted.18  By 
1939, the House of Representatives passed a bill that prohibited trademarks 
that contained “matter which tends to disparage persons, living or dead, 
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or to bring them into contempt.”19  
It was later found that the determination of what is disparaging was too 
subjective. 
In subsequent legislation, the term “disparage” was not removed or 
changed.20  A second bill added the words “may disparage.”  This was 
defined as “to move, direct, or develop one’s course in a particular direction; 
to exhibit an inclination or tendency.”21  This is clearly broader than 
scandalous and leaves open the question of what is disparaging under the 
Lanham Act.22 Currently, the United States Trademark and Patent Office 
(PTO) has the burden of showing that the trademark is perceived as 
disparaging before it can deny a trademark.  Once the government 
establishes a prima facie case, the applicant has the burden of rebutting it by 
showing the trademark is not disparaging speech. 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 296. 
 16. Id. at 295. 
 17. Id. at 297. 
 18. Id. at 299. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 300. 
 21. Id. at 301. 
 22. Id. at 301. 
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II. The Tam Court’s Determination That Trademarks Were An 
Expressive Speech Is Misguided 
Filing for a trademark is indeed speech, and it is a powerful form of 
commercial speech.  A trademark allows individuals to benefit 
economically, but it in no way determines the reliability of a product because 
the government is not communicating a message about the product.23  The 
government can make viewpoint based restrictions on commercial speech.24  
By refusing to register offensive trademarks, the government chills speech 
because applicants will avoid submissions that are vulnerable to a Lanham 
Act challenge.25  In fact, applicant uncertainty is inevitable because the 
Lanham Act extends even to speech that may be disparaging, and the 
government is not required to prove that it actually disparages a particular 
group of individuals.26 However, the government is only placing restrictions 
on a trademark and the applicant is still capable of using the name or 
communicating a message through other forms of speech. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en 
banc recently held in In re Tam that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Trademark 
Act’s (“§ 2(a)”) prohibition against the registration disparaging trademarks 
violated the First Amendment because it constituted viewpoint 
discrimination.27  Simon Shiao Tam (“Mr. Tam”) applied to the PTO for 
registration of “The Slants.”28 
The PTO concluded that Mr. Tam’s proposed trademark was 
disparaging to people of Asian heritage and rejected the application.29  Mr. 
Tam claimed that the name of the band was essentially a symbol of pride 
meant to “take ownership” of Asian stereotypes.30  On review, the court of 
appeals determined that Mr. Tam’s proposed trademark was protected by the 
First Amendment and held that “§ 2(a) regulates expressive, not commercial 
speech.”31  It found that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard to apply 
to this type of speech restriction.  Under that standard, the court stated that 
even if the government’s prohibition of disparaging trademarks was a 
regulation of commercial speech, it lacked a substantial government interest 
in its action in prohibiting the band’s name trademark because of its 
 
 23. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1340. 
 26. Id. at 1341–42. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1331. 
 29. Id. at 1332–33. 
 30. Id. at 1331. 
 31. Id. at 1355. 
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disparaging nature.32  However, the Tam court based its conclusions on the 
erroneous determination that strict scrutiny review applied. 
A. Trademark Denial Based on Disparaging Nature Is a 
Regulation of Commercial and Not Expressive 
Speech. 
The Tam court justified its decision by stating that although trademarks 
have a commercial role, § 2(a) regulated the expressive aspects of the 
mark.33  The court argued that it could not sustain the PTO’s decision on this 
basis.34  Through this holding, it essentially ignored decades of binding 
precedent.  The U.S. Supreme Court roughly defined commercial speech as 
“speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction.”35  Mr. 
Tam unquestionably had intentions of proposing commercial transactions 
with his band and proposed trademark.  Instead of separating the perceived 
commercial aspects of the proposed trademark with the expressive ones, the 
court of appeals should have conceded that an application for a trademark 
was commercial speech. 
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council Inc., the Supreme Court maintained that for-profit motivation was 
irrelevant in terms of determining whether speech was commercial.36  In a 
separate case it was also suggested that a link between products and 
economic drive could help determine whether speech was commercial in 
borderline cases.37  In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the Court 
determined that even though a company mailed mass advertisements and had 
an economic motivation for doing so, this did not end the inquiry on whether 
the mailing was considered commercial speech or not.38  However, these 
combined factors tipped the scales in favor of the government, and the court 
determined that the advertisements were considered commercial speech.39 
 
 32. Id. at 1368–71. 
 33. Id. at 1357. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1339. 
 36. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 773 (1975). 
 37. Leonardo Machado Pontes, Trademark and Freedom of Speech: A New 
Comparison Between the U.S. and the EU System in the Awakening of Johan 
Deckmyn v. Helena Vandersteen, 1, 6 (World Intellectual Prop. Org., Doc. Code 
WIPO.IPL/GE/15/T3, 2015), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ipl_ge_15/wipo_ipl_ge_15_t3.pdf. 
 38. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983). 
 39. Id. at 67(considering three factors in determining commercial speech:  (1) 
whether it is meant to be an advertisement; (2) whether it references a particular 
product; and (3) whether there is an economic motivation for disseminating the 
material). 
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Despite the Court’s holding in Bolger, the Tam court found that Mr. 
Tam’s mark had predominantly expressive aspect, rather than a commercial 
aspect, because of the perceived goals of the proposed band’s name.40  
Regardless of the message that Mr. Tam meant to send to the public through 
his band’s name, it can hardly be argued that he had no intention of 
promoting his brand or had no economic motive for doing so.  The Bolger 
Court, however, also recognized that the advertisements “contain[ed] 
discussions of important public issues.”41  In spite of this finding, the Bolger 
Court found that the factors determinative of whether speech was 
commercial or expressive.42 
Without first addressing the factors provided in Bolger, the Tam court 
used the inextricably intertwined test, in which the court determines whether 
commercial and non-commercial speech are closely connected and 
essentially inseparable.43  Using this test, the Supreme Court upheld a ban on 
private commercial enterprises (with exceptions) operating on university 
campuses.44  Fox, a student, sued to allow her and her fellow students to host 
“Tupperware parties,” at which a company through a hostess would sell 
Tupperware to a group of ten or more people and also provide lessons on 
home economics.45  Fox argued that the mix of commercial activity and 
teaching of other subjects were inextricably intertwined.46  The Court 
disagreed, finding that there was nothing inextricable about selling 
Tupperware and providing lessons on home economics.47  Similarly, Mr. 
Tam’s mark is not inextricable with promoting social change and cultural 
pride.  The band has other means of expression at its disposal.   Therefore, 
since there is nothing inextricable about Tam’s cultural pride, the court 
should have found that “The Slants” was commercial speech subject to 
intermediate scrutiny. 
 
 40. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1338 (“Mr. Tam explicitly selected his mark to 
create a dialogue on controversial political and social issues.  With his band name, 
Mr. Tam makes a statement about racial and ethnic identity.  He seeks to shift the 
meaning of, and thereby reclaim, an emotionally charged word.  He advocates for 
social change and challenges perceptions of people of Asian descent.  His band 
name pushes people.  It offends.  Despite this—indeed, because of it—Mr. Tam’s 
band name is expressive speech.”). 
 41. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67–68. 
 42. Id. 
 43. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1339 (citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 
Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)). 
 44. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 471–72 (1989). 
 45. Id. at 472. 
 46. Id. at 474. 
 47. Id. 
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B. The Tam Court Incorrectly Applied the Central Hudson 
Test Because Trademarks Are Commercial Speech 
The Tam court concluded that the government failed to prove that there 
was a substantial government interest in § 2(a)’s prohibition on disparaging 
marks.48  Its conclusion rested on the test laid out by the Supreme Court in 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.49 
Central Hudson recognized that commercial speech first “must concern 
lawful activity and not be misleading.”50  Once the court has found that there 
is a lawful activity then court must inquire “whether the government issue is 
substantial[,] and if the regulation materially advances the government’s 
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that objective.”51 
The court correctly concluded that Mr. Tam’s proposed trademark was 
neither unlawful nor misleading.52  However, the court’s analysis of the 
second part of the Central Hudson test was flawed.  The court reasoned that 
the interest of § 2(a) rested upon whether or not the government approved of 
the message behind the mark.53  This was not correct.  In the 1905 
Trademark Act Congress established a two-part test to restrain the 
government from infringing upon speech rights or reacting to an unpopular 
message.54  Under the first prong, “The Slants” mark is unfit for a trademark 
because the likely meaning in context with other markings and within the 
marketplace embodied a stereotype. “The Slants” also failed under the 
second prong because the general public would find the mark scandalous in 
light of the contemporary application.  Mr. Tam’s intent was not evident in 
the mark, and the only message his commercial speech communicated was 
the band name “The Slants” itself.  The public may not know that the band 
members are Asian and may never come to know Mr. Tam’s intent because 
of the off-putting name.  Mr. Tam’s intent was not the norm when this word 
was spoken in reference to the Asian population, and history was not erased 
through the word’s reclamation. 
Although the Tam court drew analogies between trademarks and 
copyright laws, the court was misguided.  In a full copyrighted text, the 
public is able to discern the speaker’s intent through consumption of the 
entire work.  Additionally, writings include historical events and serve to 
educate the general public about times when people behaved poorly so as not 
to repeat the mistakes in history.  Finally, a written word promotes thought.  
 
 48. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1358. 
 49. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 50. Id. at 566. 
 51. Id. 
 52. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1355. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, §§1–30, 33 Stat. 724 (repealed Lanham Act of 
1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427); see Abdel-khalik, supra note 13, at 294–95 (2015). 
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Our society values an exchange of ideas and thoughts.  In an effort to 
continue with a free exchange of ideas, it is important that government does 
not regulate a message because it is unpopular or reflects poorly on itself.  At 
the same time, the government is not the messenger via copyright because 
credit for the idea is given to the author.55  In contrast, a trademark is given 
by the government with the purpose of commercial exchange and some 
minimal form of reliability.  A trademark does not promote one product over 
another, and it does nothing to advance a speaker’s thoughts.  Rather the 
trademark confers benefits to its user without communicating anything about 
the producer or the reliability of the actual product.  Therefore, a trademark 
is distinguishable from a copyright. 
 
III. The Washington Redskins Court Correctly Determined 
That Trademarks Were Not Expressive Speech 
The most recent string of trademark litigation prior to the Tam court 
was the Washington Redskins’ trademark case, Pro Football, Inc. v. 
Blackhorse (“PFI”).56  This trademark, well-known to football and non-
football fans alike, has been with the team since 1932 when George Preston 
first purchased the team.57  Sixty years later, a group of Native Americans 
sought to prevent the team from further using this trademark by filing a 
petition with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).58  Among 
other things, TTAB argued that the trademark can potentially disparage 
Native Americans.59  One of the most controversial developments took place 
when the PFI court issued a ruling in 2014 that the trademark was canceled 
because the team’s name was disparaging to Native Americans.60 
Many individuals in the general public requested that the pro football 
team be required to change its name because it was offensive and was a 
racial slur that denigrates  Native Americans.  In reaction to that claim, the 
team stated that it did not wish to change the name because their intent 
behind the name was to celebrate the contributions made by Native 
Americans.61  In light of the most recent decision made by the Tam court, the 
pro football team will not be required to change its name.  The Tam court 
ignored the prior ruling in this litigation that found § 2(a) does not receive 
 
 55. Pro Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 442 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 448. 
 58. Id. at 439. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 487. 
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First Amendment protections and, as a form of government speech, is 
exempt from strict scrutiny.62 
In fact, the PFI court was correct in finding that denying a trademark 
registration does not infringe upon speech rights because denying trademarks 
does not proscribe an individual’s conduct, only government endorsement.63  
Under this logic both Mr. Tam and the Washington football team could 
continue to exercise their free speech because the government did not say 
that they could not continue using the chosen name.  Rather, the government 
will simply not register any disparaging or scandalous trademarks.64  The 
key here is the registration, not the speech, and the commercial benefits 
registration confers.  Mr. Tam and the Washington football team are still 
capable of enlightening the public of their pride in a particular heritage 
without a trademark. What seemed to escape the Tam court is the rationale as 
to why neither Mr. Tam nor the Washington football team would want to 
decline to do so without a trademark.  That motive was purely economic in 
nature which suggests that a trademark was more commercial speech than 
expressive speech. 
Conclusion 
The Tam case represents important issues in trademark law in the 
United States today.  In an era where Americans are becoming increasingly 
sensitive to hurtful stereotypes promoted by businesses, we ask ourselves 
how far we are willing to tolerate such symbols and whether we even have a 
choice in the matter.  In the case of “The Slants,” the court’s decision sets a 
precedent that focuses on the subjective intention of those proposing the 
trademark.  The issue in this case was not speech, but registration of the 
trademark itself.  The government is not proposing that either entity cannot 
use a symbol, word, or other mark; rather that it will not register disparaging 
or scandalous trademarks.  This is because the government has a substantial 
interest in preventing the perpetuation of slurs and stereotypes that are 
furthered every time there is an advertisement, a live event, or even a simple 
sale of merchandise. 
 
 
 62. Id. at 441 (“Federal law does not create trademarks.”) (quoting In re Trade-
mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879)). 
 63. Id. at 439. 
 64. Id. at 455. 
